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One key issue for theories of cognition is how abstract concepts, such as freedom, are
represented. According to the WAT (Words As social Tools) proposal, abstract concepts
activate both sensorimotor and linguistic/social information, and their acquisitionmodality
involves the linguistic experience more than the acquisition of concrete concepts. We
report an experiment in which participants were presented with abstract and concrete
definitions followed by concrete and abstract target-words. When the definition and
the word matched, participants were required to press a key, either with the hand or
with the mouth. Response times and accuracy were recorded. As predicted, we found
that abstract definitions and abstract words yielded slower responses and more errors
compared to concrete definitions and concrete words. More crucially, there was an
interaction between the target-words and the effector used to respond (hand, mouth).
While responses with the mouth were overall slower, the advantage of the hand over
the mouth responses was more marked with concrete than with abstract concepts.
The results are in keeping with grounded and embodied theories of cognition and
support the WAT proposal, according to which abstract concepts evoke linguistic-social
information, hence activate the mouth. The mechanisms underlying the mouth activation
with abstract concepts (re-enactment of acquisition experience, or re-explanation of the
word meaning, possibly through inner talk) are discussed. To our knowledge this is the
first behavioral study demonstrating with real words that the advantage of the hand over
the mouth is more marked with concrete than with abstract concepts, likely because of
the activation of linguistic information with abstract concepts.
Keywords: abstract concepts, mouth activation, abstract words, language grounding, embodied cognition,
grounded cognition
INTRODUCTION
We all know what is a “hat,” and what is “justice.” However, we would likely agree that the
knowledge of what is “justice” is more complex than knowing what a hat is, also because we can
more easily represent the referent of a “hat” through the senses, as vision and touch; furthermore,
even if all our concepts have marked inter-individual differences, the way people of our culture
represent a hat is likely more homogeneous than the way they represent justice; finally, we likely
change over time our notion of “hat” less than our notion of “justice.” Even if we do not think
they are dichotomously opposed, we consider “hat” and “justice” as two quite good examples,
respectively, of concrete and of abstract concepts.
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While the importance of the challenge to understand how
we represent concepts has been recognized even by ancient
philosophers, the debate on how abstract concepts, such as
“justice” and “career,” are represented has recently become
particularly hot, as testified by recent reviews and special
topics (for recent reviews, see Pecher et al., 2011; Shallice and
Cooper, 2013; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014; Dove, 2016; Reilly
et al., 2016; for special issues see Borghi and Pecher, 2011,
Frontiers in cognition; Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013, Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience). This is likely due to the raise and
development of embodied and grounded (from now on EG)
theories, according to which cognition is grounded in our
experiences, sensorimotor system, and bodily states (Barsalou,
2008; Borghi and Caruana, 2015). After their initial development,
in the second half of the nineties’, in the last years EG theories
have been supported by an increasing amount of evidence and
have seen an exponential growth in the fields of conceptualization
and language comprehension (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Gallese,
2008; Chatterjee, 2010; Gentner, 2010; Barsalou, 2012, 2016;
Bergen, 2012; see for special issues Borghi and Pecher, 2011;
Cappa and Pulvermüller, 2012; Dove, 2015). However, this
evidence is mainly focused on representation of objects and
actions, while compelling evidence on different kinds of abstract
concepts and, most importantly, a unitary EG view explaining
all kinds of abstract concepts is still missing, as the brief review
below will show. One of the reason underlying this lack is
obvious, even if not trivial: demonstrating that abstract concepts
as “justice” or “freedom” are grounded in the sensorimotor
system is not as straightforward as demonstrating that the
concept of “cup” activates the motor system. It is therefore
widely recognized that solving the problem of abstract concepts
representation would represent a major leap forward for EG
cognition perspective.
Still, the benefits of a deeper comprehension of how abstract
concepts are represented would not concern only EG theories.
The alternative to EG theories are distributional views of
meaning. According to these theories abstract concepts can be
equated to concrete ones, since the meaning of both kinds of
concepts is given by their associations in a semantic network (e.g.,
Lund and Burgess, 1996; Landauer and Dumais, 1997). However,
in our view distributional views are not able to fully solve the
problem of conceptual representation, since they are affected
by the symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990): how can we
represent a concept without ever having an idea of its referent?
To address the challenge to explain abstract concepts in the
last 10–15 years many proposals on abstract concepts have been
presented, which start from an embodied background. The two
traditional and yet influential theories on abstract concepts,
proposed back in the eighties respectively by Paivio (1986)
and Schwanenflugel et al. (1988, 1992), ascribe, respectively,
the disadvantage in processing and recall of abstract over
concrete words either to their lower degree of imageability,
hence to the impossibility to retrieve both verbal and imagistic
information for abstract concepts, or to the reduced availability of
contexts for abstract concepts.While recent proposals on abstract
concepts have taken inspiration from Paivio’s dual coding theory
(DCT) and have proposed it in a novel version, the context
availability theory (CAT) has had less fortune, also due to
some recent empirical disconfirmation: for example, Connell and
Lynott (2012) have shown that concepts characterized by higher
perceptual strength, which CAT would categorize as concrete,
evoke a higher number of contexts compared to concepts with
low perceptual strength. Moffat et al. (2015) confirmed the
importance of contextual availability for concepts, but questioned
that the relevance of this construct is unique to abstract concepts.
Recent EG theories on abstract concepts can be divided into
two kinds: those that do not focus on the difference between
concrete and abstract concepts, trying to demonstrate that both
concrete and abstract concepts are grounded in perception and
action, and those that consider abstract and concrete concepts
different, even if not dichotomously opposed.
Examples of evidence favoring the view proposing that
abstract and concrete concepts do not differ is obtained
thanks to the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) and
the approach-avoidance effect. The ACE effect shows that
participants are faster when the forward vs. away movement they
are required to perform is congruent with the movement implied
by both abstract and concrete sentence (“give/take the pizza” vs.
“give/take the news”; Glenberg et al., 2008a,b; Guan et al., 2013).
In a similar vein, evidence on approach-avoidance has shown
that participants tend to attract positive objects and entities and
to reject negative ones with both concrete and abstract concepts
(Chen and Bargh, 1999; see for a recent overview Phaf et al., 2014
and for a study on oral approach-avoidance Topolinski et al.,
2014). Even if this evidence is interesting, it is clearly confined
to specific cases (e.g., use of transfer sentences, use of words with
a clear positive vs. negative valence).
More crucial for the present paper are proposals that, even
if they do not assume that abstract and concrete concepts
represent a dichotomy, try to explain the numerous differences
between concrete and abstract concepts. The older and most
influential one is the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980), according to which we understand the
meaning of abstract words mapping them to concrete words: for
example, we understand the meaning of “category” referring to
the concrete concept of “container” (Boot and Pecher, 2011),
or the abstract concept of “time” relying to the more concrete
notion of “space” (e.g., Santiago et al., 2007; Casasanto and
Boroditsky, 2008; Lai and Boroditsky, 2013). A lot of both
linguistic and behavioral compelling evidence has been provided
in the last years in support of the CMT (see an overview
by Winter et al., 2015). This theory has the advantage to
focus on a mechanism rather than on the content of specific
abstract concepts. However, it remains to be understood to what
extent it is generalizable to those abstract concepts the concrete
counterpart of which is not obvious, as “fantasy.” Furthermore,
its developmental course is not obvious, since metaphors are
learned by children later than abstract concepts, and children’s
comprehension ofmetaphors remains quite poor until 8–10 years
of age (Dove, 2009). According to the recently proposed Affective
Embodiment Account (AEA; Kousta et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al.,
2013, 2014), abstract concepts would be characterized by the
fact that they evoke mostly emotional experience compared to
concrete concepts. The theory has recently been supported by
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behavioral and neuroimaging evidence, and different recent work
has highlighted the importance of emotions for abstract concepts
(see e.g., Newcombe et al., 2012; Siakaluk et al., 2014). However,
such evidence has not always been replicated (e.g., Skipper and
Olson, 2014): for example, measuring facial muscle activity a
valence effect in the m. corrugator supercilii was found with
concrete but not with abstract words (Küenecke et al., 2015).
One potential problem of this view is that there is evidence
suggesting that emotions represent a subset of concepts which
are neither abstract nor concrete, with their own peculiarities
(Altarriba et al., 1999; Altarriba and Bauer, 2004; Setti and
Caramelli, 2005; Dreyer et al., 2015). A further interesting
theory that in our view is full of potentialities was proposed by
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) and states that, compared
to concrete concepts, abstract ones evoke more social aspects
of situations and more introspective properties (see also Zwaan,
2015). The evidence favoring this view is however limited and
mostly confined to feature production tasks (see also Borghi
et al., 2016); furthermore, the mechanisms underlying abstract
concepts representation have not been fully specified. Finally,
its generalizability could be limited: for example, introspective
elements are likely to occur primarily with mental states and
emotional concepts, less with institutional abstract concepts
(Roversi et al., 2013). More interesting would be the radical
proposal that, the more abstract the concepts are, the more they
require introspective mechanisms in action. Further research is
thus needed to better clarify these aspects.
The big novelty in the field is represented by multiple
representation views (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008; Dove,
2009; Crutch et al., 2013; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014), and
particularly by those that emphasize the importance of both
sensorimotor experience and linguistic experience for conceptual
representation. The LASS theory, proposed by Larry Barsalou
and collaborators (Barsalou et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008),
has been the first to highlight the importance of language for
conceptual representation, even if language is considered more
as a shortcut to access the conceptual content than as having
an importance per se. Dove (2009, 2011, 2016) partly relying
on Paivio’s view has emphasized the importance of language
for abstract concepts representation. His theoretical proposal
is very close to the WAT proposal we are focusing on here; the
main departure is that, according to Dove, language provides an
amodal medium of thought, while we do not see the necessity
that such a system is amodal and not grounded in sensorimotor
systems.
Here we will focus on the WAT (Words As social Tools)
proposal (Borghi and Cimatti, 2009; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014),
which can be considered as an embodied and grounded multiple
representation view. According to this view, both concrete and
abstract concepts are grounded in the sensorimotor system.
However, abstract concepts would activate more the linguistic
and social neural system, because the linguistic and social
experiences are particularly relevant for their acquisition. In
support of this idea, the literature on Modality of Acquisition
(Wauters et al., 2003) shows that more concrete words are
typically acquired perceptually, while with an increase in words
complexity and abstractness and in children’s age the linguistic
acquisition modality becomes progressively more relevant. Due
to the importance of linguistic experience for abstract concepts,
according to WAT abstract concepts would be more affected
by cross-linguistic differences compared to concrete ones. As to
brain representation, linguistic networks related both to language
comprehension and production as well as networks related to
social behavior should be more activated by abstract than by
concrete concepts. This activation of language should lead to a
higher involvement of the mouth during conceptual processing,
in line with the view that both language comprehension and
production involve the motor system and are two faces of the
same coin (D’Ausilio et al., 2009, 2012; Lieberman, 2009).
The experiment we will report focuses precisely on the mouth
activation during abstract concepts comprehension. If language
plays a major role for the representation of abstract concepts,
then we predict that this activation of linguistic experience has an
embodied counterpart, and that it leads to a higher activation of
the mouth compared to the hand in the case of abstract concepts.
To test this hypothesis we decided to use a task that implies
deep conceptual processing. Participants were presented with
definitions followed by target-words, and were required to decide
whether the definition was correct for the target-word or not.
Target-words were concrete and abstract, and definitions also
could be more concrete or more abstract. If the definition was
correct for the target-word, participants had to press a button;
if it was not, they had to refrain from responding (go-nogo
paradigm). Critically, in order to record responses we had two
different devices: a normal response box, with a key at the center
that participants had to press with the dominant hand, and a
key typically used for paraplegic patients, that participants kept
among their teeth and pressed with a gesture similar to that of
biting (see Figure 1).We could not use the same key in both cases
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm and device. Participants were required
to decide whether the definition was appropriate for the target-word. In order
to respond “yes” they had either to press with their dominant hand a key on
the response box (right) or to press with their teeth the key they held in their
mouth (left). The two devices were used by each participant in two different
experimental blocks, the order of which was counterbalanced across subjects.
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since the key for paraplegic patients would have been very hard
to press with the fingers.
We predicted to replicate the concreteness effect: in keeping
with most of the literature (but see Kousta et al., 2011, for an
opposite abstractness effect, and Barca et al., 2002, who did
not find the effect), we predicted that abstract words would be
processed slower than concrete ones.
More crucially, we predicted that, if it is true that abstract
concepts activate linguistic information, hence the mouth,
in order to process their meaning, then we should find an
interaction between the kind of word and the effector used to
respond. Specifically, we expected a facilitation with the mouth
responses with abstract concepts compared to concrete concepts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-nine students of the University of Bologna (not involved
in pretests; 17 females and 12 males; mean age: 22.9; range: 18–
33 years) participated in the experiment. All participants were
Italian native speakers, they were right-handed, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, normal hearing, and no history of
neurological/psychiatric disorders or brain damage based on self-
report. All participants gave informed consent to participate in
accordance with the guidelines of the Ethical Committee of the
University of Bologna and volunteered for their participation.
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the
University of Bologna.
Materials
Materials were composed by two groups of stimuli: definitions,
used as primes, and words, used as targets.
We first selected 15 concrete and 15 abstract words from
the database of Italian words by Della Rosa et al. (2010), for a
total of 30 target-words. In order to distinguish concrete and
abstract stimuli we considered various dimensions: concrete and
abstract words significantly differed not only according to the
Abstractness and Concreteness dimensions, but also according
to Imageability, Acquisition Modality, Age of Acquisition and
Contextual Availability (ps < 0.01). The Average Length of
the words and the words Familiarity did not differ across
concrete and abstract categories (ps < 0.1). Overall, concrete
words were more concrete, less abstract, more imageable, more
often perceptually rather than linguistically acquired, earlier
acquired, and they activated more contexts compared to abstract
ones. We decided to use these dimensions to polarize the two
categories. Furthermore, since in the literature it is in some
cases assumed, on the basis of ratings, that emotions represent
a subset of abstract words (e.g., Kousta et al., 2011), while some
evidence shows that emotions are processed differently from both
concrete and abstract words (Altarriba et al., 1999; Altarriba and
Bauer, 2004), we decided to avoid including strongly emotionally
valenced words, as “fault” (“colpa”), “relief” (“sollievo”), “disease”
(“disagio”), from the sample of abstract words.
For each of the selected words we created two different
definitions, a more abstract and a more concrete one, for a
total of 60 definitions. We distinguished the two kinds of
definitions using the following criteria. Concrete definitions
typically described the content of the word using perceptual
relations, for example referring to their color and shape (e.g.,
“flag”: “the Italian one is red, white, and green”), and/or thematic
relations, for example referring to specific situations and events
(e.g., “career”: “When you get a promotion at work”). Abstract
definitions were instead more general and scientific, and were
typically expressed through taxonomic relations: e.g., “cock” “Pet
bird, it belongs to the family of chickens.”
Definitions were pretested in order to ensure that they differed
in degree of abstractness. All the definitions were submitted to a
rating task performed by an independent group of 20 students of
the University of Bologna. Participants were required to decide,
using a seven point scale, whether the definition they read could
be considered as more abstract or more concrete. A T Student
for paired samples on the average ratings of all definitions (N =
20) was only marginally significant, t(19) = 1.746, SE = 13.515,
p = 0.097. In the cases in which the distinction between the
two definitions was not sufficiently marked, i.e., the two average
ratings did not differ, the two definitions were thus modified by
the experimenters in order to render themmore clearly different.
Specifically, we reformulated the concrete definition of “statue”
and the abstract definitions of “justice,” “logics,” and “duty.” A
further T Student for paired samples on the average ratings of
all definitions except the reformulated ones (N = 16) showed
that the selected definitions significantly differed in abstractness,
t(15) = 2.800, SE= 13.481, p= 0.013.
Among the original 30 words we selected 20 test words;
each word was accompanied by two definitions. The remaining
10 words and 20 definitions were used as fillers (see Table 1).
Overall we had a total of 129 stimuli, each composed by a
definition and a word. There were 40 critical stimuli, each
of which presented a correct combination of a definition and
a word; each of them was repeated twice, once for each of
the two experimental blocks. Nine stimuli were used for the
training and 40 stimuli, which presented wrong combinations of
definitions and words, were used as “fillers.” To ascertain that
the selected words were not highly emotional ones, we asked
16 participants to decide using a 7-points Likert scale to what
extent each word referred to the emotional sphere. Participants
were presented with the 20 selected words and with further 16
words from the same database (Della Rosa et al., 2010) that we
considered emotional (e.g., “love,” “anxiety”). The 20 selected
words significantly differed from the emotional ones, t(34) =
7.157, SE = 42.727, p < 0.001. The by-items ANOVA on the
three kinds of words (selected abstract words, selected concrete
words, and emotional words) was also significant, F(2, 33) =
100.997, R2 = 0.860, p < 0.001). A follow-up analysis of the
simple effects, with the Bonferroni adjustment, revealed that both
concrete and abstract words scored lower in emotional value
than emotional words (ps < 0.001), thus confirming our choice.
The abstract and concrete selected words differed according to
Concreteness, Abstractness, Imageability, Acquisition Modality,
Age of Acquisition, and Contextual Availability (respectively,
Concreteness, t(18) = 9.513, SE= 15.375, p< 0.001; Abstractness:
t(18) = 24.239, SE = 16.870; Imageability, t(18) = −26.090, SE
= 16.39715, p < 0.001; Modality of Acquisition: t(18) = 12.360,
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TABLE 1 | The stimuli.
SELECTED WORDS AND DEFINITIONS
Word Kind of word Definition Kind of
definition
Gallina hen Concrete Il suo verso è “coccodè,” ha due zampe e si trova nelle fattorie. /Its verse is “cackle,” it has two legs and
is located in farms.
Concrete
Uccello domestico, appartiene alla famiglia dei polli. /Pet bird, it belongs to the family of chickens. Abstract
Sabbia sand Concrete Può formare fondali marini e spiagge bianche o dorate. /It can form sea backdrops and white and
golden beaches.
Concrete
Roccia costituita da granelli di altre rocce./Rock composed of grains of other rocks. Abstract
Ghiaccio ice Concrete Forma gli iceberg o si trova a cubetti nei cocktail. /It shapes icebergs or it can be found in cubes in
cocktails.
Concrete
Elemento formato dall’acqua a zero gradi e allo stato solido. /Element formed by water at zero degrees
and in the solid state.
Abstract
Cappello hat Concrete Può essere di paglia o a cilindro e viene portato in testa. /It can be of straw, it can be a cylinder and it is
typically worn on the head.
Concrete
Accessorio d’abbigliamento che si indossa in testa. /Accessory clothing worn on the head. Abstract
Stivale boot Concrete Calzatura alta ed elegante, anche adatta al maltempo. /Tall and elegant footwear, also suitable for bad
weather.
Concrete
Vi rassomiglia molto la forma dell’Italia. /It is very similar to the shape of Italy. Abstract
Fontana fountain Concrete La trovi nelle piazze, puoi bere l’acqua che ne sgorga. /You can find it in the streets/squares, you can
drink the water that gushes.
Concrete
Costruzione ornamentale da cui fuoriescono getti d’acqua. /Ornamental building from which produce
water jets.
Abstract
Statua statue Concrete Raffigura oggetti, animali, eroi, è in pietra, bronzo o altri materiali. /It depicts objects, animals, heroes, it is
made of stone, bronze or other materials.
Concrete
Opera di scultura a tutto tondo, in marmo o bronzo. /Sculpture work in the round, in marble or bronze. Abstract
Pennello brush Concrete Lo tiene tra le dita il pittore per dipingere. /The painter holds it among his/her fingers in order to paint. Concrete
Strumento per stendere vernice o per dipingere. /Instrument used to spread paint or to paint. Abstract
Pistola pistol Concrete Arma da fuoco dotata di grilletto, che si impugna con una mano sola. /Firearm with trigger, that you hold
with one hand.
Concrete
Arma da fuoco a canna corta dotata di caricatore e grilletto. /Short-barreled firearm with a magazine and
trigger.
Abstract
Bandiera flag Concrete Quella italiana è di colore rosso, bianco e verde. /The Italian one is red, white and green colored. Concrete
Può simboleggiare una nazione o una squadra. / It can symbolize a nation or a team. Abstract
Inizio beginning Abstract Il momento in cui si apre una partita, un gioco o una storia. /The moment in which a game or a story
starts.
Concrete
Il punto di partenza, il primissimo momento./The starting point, the very first moment. Abstract
Ragione reason Abstract La segui quando prendi una decisione senza basarti sui sentimenti. /You follow it when you take a
decision without relying on your feelings.
Concrete
Intelletto, facoltà che distingue gli uomini dalle bestie. /Intellect, quality distinguishing humans from
beasts.
Abstract
Critica criticism Abstract Si fa quando si scrive un saggio per giudicare l’opera di un artista. /You make it when you write an essay
to evaluate the work of an artist.
Concrete
Facoltà di giudicare obiettivamente opere o persone. /Ability to objectively judge works or people. Abstract
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
SELECTED WORDS AND DEFINITIONS
Word Kind of word Definition Kind of
definition
Motivo motive Abstract Chi è assente ne ha sempre uno buono per giustificarsi. /Who is absent has always a good one to justify
himself/herself.
Concrete
Causa, ragione che spinge a compiere una determinata azione. /Cause, reason that induces somebody
to perform a given action.
Abstract
Coscienza
consciousness/conscience
Abstract Se la sente sporca chi commette una cattiva azione. /The person who commits a bad action feels it dirty. Concrete
Consapevolezza che i soggetti hanno di sé stessi e del mondo. /Awareness that subjects have of
themselves and of the world.
Abstract
Dovere duty Abstract Lo compie un soldato che esegue i suoi ordini. /A soldier executing the orders accomplishes it. Concrete
Legge morale che impone l’esecuzione degli obblighi morali o legali. /Moral law imposing the execution
of moral or legal obligations.
Abstract
Giustizia justice Abstract Punire i colpevoli, risarcire i danneggiati, dare a ognuno ciò che gli spetta. /To punish the guilty, to repair
the damage, to give everyone his/her due.
Concrete
La virtù data dalla volontà di rispettare il diritto di tutti. /The virtue given by the willing to respect the rights
of everyone.
Abstract
Carriera career Abstract Si fa quando al lavoro ottieni una promozione. /You make it when you obtain a promotion at work. Concrete
Il progresso nel proprio campo lavorativo. /The progress in one’s own working field. Abstract
Fiducia trust Abstract Si ha quando ti lasci cadere indietro sapendo che qualcuno ti prenderà. /You have it when you let
yourself fall back knowing that somebody will take you.
Concrete
Senso di sicurezza che deriva dalla stima riposta in qualcuno. /Security feeling deriving from the estimate
placed in someone.
Abstract
Logica logics Abstract La usi quando da un indizio fai un ragionamento corretto. /You use it when from a clue you make a
correct reasoning.
Concrete
Disciplina filosofica che studia le leggi del ragionamento. /Philosophical discipline that investigates the
laws of reasoning.
Abstract
SE= 22.968; Age of Acquisition: t(18) =−7.315, SE= 24.375, p<
0.001; Contextual Availability: t(18) =−13.042, SE = 16.147, p<
0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.001; while they did not differ in Number
of letters and in Familiarity [Familiarity: t(18) = −0.443, SE =
8.348, p= 0.663; Number of Letters: t(18) = 0.596, SE = 0.48648,
p= 0.545].
Procedure
We used a go-nogo paradigm: Participants were instructed to
read the definition followed by the word and to press a button
if the definition was appropriate for the word. If the definition
was not appropriate, they had to refrain from responding.
The experiment included two experimental blocks, the
presentation order of which was counterbalanced across
participants. The trials in the two blocks were the same, but in
one block responses had to be given with the hand, in the other
with the mouth. Each block was preceded by some training trials,
in order to allow participants to practice with the new button,
especially the button to press with the teeth: three trials preceded
the first block, and six training trials preceded the second block.
Each experimental block was composed by 60 trials, of which 40
were correct combinations, and 20 were incorrect combinations,
i.e., fillers; all trials were presented in random order. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two groups.
Participants were individually tested in a quiet laboratory
room (Emcolab, University of Bologna). Only the participant and
the experimenter were present in the room; after the training the
experimenter sat outside the participant’s sight in order to avoid
any interference with the task.
Testing took place on a PC running EPrime2 Professional
software. Participants sat on a comfortable chair in front of a
computer screen, at a distance of about 60 cm. They read the
written instruction describing the experiment on the computer
screen. In no case further instruction from the experimenter were
needed; he only needed to clarify to them how to use the button
for the mouth responses.
Each trial began with a centered black fixation cross for
300 ms, followed by presentation of a definition. Definitions
remained on the screen for a time varying from 2.3 to 3.7 s,
depending on the number of syllables each definition included.
Once the definition disappeared, the word appeared; it remained
on the screen until the response, or for a maximum of 1.5 s. After
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1 s the next trial started. Participants were asked to decide if the
definition and the word matched and to indicate their decision
by pressing a key. They were invited to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible as their response time and accuracy were
being measured. Depending on the block, the key had to be
pressed either with the hand, or with the mouth.
RESULTS
Responses to filler sentences and incorrect responses (6.51%)
were discarded. Data were trimmed as follows: RTs faster/slower
than the overall participant meanminus/plus 2 SD (4.007%) were
excluded from the analyses.
Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman correlation coefficients were
computed between themean Response Times (RTs) of the correct
responses and the values of the dimensions obtained from the
database of Della Rosa et al. (2010) on the basis of which our
target words were selected. Results showed a positive correlation
between RTs and Abstractness, r = 0.540, p = 0.001; r = 0.770,
p < 0.001; RTs and Age of Acquisition: r = 0.417, p = 0.010; r
= 0.649, p = 0.002, and RTs and Modality of Acquisition: r =
0.474, p = 0.004; r = 0.699, p = 0.001, indicating that RTs were
longer, the more abstract words were, the later they had been
acquired and when they were acquired perceptually rather than
through linguistic modalities. RTs showed instead a significant
negative correlation with Concreteness, r = −0.451, p = 0.006;
r = −0.701, p = 0.001, Contextual Availability, r = −0.512, p
= 0.002, r = −0.724, p < 0.001, and Imageability, r = −0.474,
p = 0.004; r = −0.690, p = 0.001. Basically RTs were faster the
more words were concrete, evoked a higher number of contexts,
and were more imageable. The correlations between RTs and
words Familiarity and number of Letters were not significant,
respectively: r = −0.026, p = 0.871, r = −0.041, p = 0.863; r =
−0.138, p= 0.436, r =−0.188, p= 0.427.
Mean Response Times of the correct responses were then
submitted to a Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) with Definition (Abstract vs. Concrete), Word
(Abstract vs. Concrete), and Effector (Hand vs. Mouth) as the
within-subject factors (F1). A further within-items ANOVA (F2)
was performed, with Definition (Abstract vs. Concrete), and
Effector (Hand vs. Mouth) as the within-item factors and Word
(Abstract vs. Concrete) as the between-item factor.
All main effects were significant: as predicted, Abstract
definitions (M= 623) were processed slower than Concrete ones
(M = 578), F1
(1, 28)
= 37.344, R2 = 0.571, p < 0.001; F2(1, 18)
= 5.889, R2 = 0.247, p = 0.026, and Abstract target-words
(M = 641) were processed slower than concrete ones (M= 560),
F1
(1, 28)
= 99.806, R2 = 0.781, p < 0.001; F2
(1, 18)
= 20.116, R2
= 0.528, p < 0.001. In order to verify whether the advantage of
abstract over concrete words was due to differences in frequency
we controlled word frequency using CoLFIS, a lexical database
of written Italian (Bertinetto et al., 2005). We performed two
T Student’s analyses for independent samples considering the
overall frequency of our target-words both as word forms and
as lemmas. Both analyses revealed that the selected abstract
words were overall more frequent than the selected concrete
ones, t(18) = 3.779, SE = 66.156, p < 0.01; t(18) = 4.018, SE =
68.015, p< 0.01. This result clearly rules out that the concreteness
effect we found was due to differences in word frequency rather
than in word meaning: if it was due to frequency, the pattern
should have been reversed, with a facilitation for abstract over
concrete words. Finally, responses with the mouth (M = 647)
were slower than responses with the hand (M = 555), F1
(1, 28)
=
11.833, R2 = 0.297, p = 0.002; F2
(1, 18)
= 163.526, R2 = 0.901,
p < 0.001. The interaction between Definition and Word was
also significant (see Figure 2), F1
(1, 28)
= 4.274, R2 = 0.132, p =
0.048; F2
(1, 18)
= 1.003, R2 = 0.053, p = 0.330: the advantage of
concrete definitions over abstract ones was more pronounced
with abstract words than with concrete words. This result is
consistent with the higher difficulty of abstract words and the
need to≪ground≫ them in concrete experiences and situations.
More crucially, the interaction between the effector and the
target-word was significant, F1
(1, 28)
= 6.651, R2 = 0.192, p =
0.015; F2
(1, 18)
= 7.194, R2 = 0.286, p= 0.015. The interaction was
due to the fact that, whereas the hand responses had an overall
advantage, with abstract words the advantage of the hand over the
mouth responses was less pronounced. To better understand the
pattern of our data, we performed T Student’s analyses for paired
samples (in the analyses by participants, indicated by t1) and for
independent and paired samples (in the analyses by concepts,
indicated by t2; see Tables 2A,B). We found that, while the
advantage of concrete over abstract words was significant both
with the hand and with the mouth device, the difference between
mouth and hand device was more marked when considering
concrete concepts than when considering abstract ones. The
analyses and the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) revealed indeed that
the difference between abstract and concrete words was highly
significant for hand responses, t1
(28)
= 9.499, SE = 10.909, p <
0.001, D = 0.727; t2
(18)
= 5.180, SE = 19.776, p < 0.001, D =
2.317, and significant but slightly less pronounced for mouth
responses: t1
(28)
= 4.697, SE = 12.671, p < 0.001, D = 0.484;
t2
(18)
= 3.184, SE = 19.979, p < 0.01, D = 1.424. Crucially
for our hypotheses, further T student analyses showed also that
FIGURE 2 | Boxplot and beeswarm graph of response times, showing
the interaction between the kind of word (AW, Abstract Words; CW,
Concrete Words) and the effector (M, Mouth; H, Hand).
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TABLE 2A | Interaction effector × word.
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Hand responses:abstract vs. concrete words
Abstract words Concrete words
Participants Mean = 606.476 Mean = 502.856
SD = 145.702 SD = 131.377
Concepts Mean = 604.159 Mean = 501.710
SD = 57.418 SD = 24.784
Mouth responses:abstract vs. concrete words
Abstract words Concrete words
Participants Mean = 676.538 Mean = 617.025
SD = 127.923 SD = 112.253
Concepts Mean = 677.307 Mean = 613.788
SD = 43.575 SD = 45.748
Abstract words: hand vs. mouth responses
Mouth Hand
Participants Mean = 676.538 Mean = 606.476
SD = 127.9238 SD = 145.702
Concepts Mean = 677.307 Mean = 604.159
SD = 43.575 SD = 57.418
Concrete words: hand vs. mouth responses
Mouth Hand
Participants Mean = 617.025 Mean = 502.856
SD = 112.253 SD = 131.377
Concepts Mean = 613.788 Mean = 501.710
SD = 45.748 SD = 24.784
Hand-Mouth difference scores
Abstract words Concrete words
Participants Mean = 70.062 Mean = 114.169
SD = 156.417 SD = 146.167
Concepts Mean = 73.148 Mean = 111.978
SD = 35.203 SD = 29.266
the difference between hand and mouth responses was more
marked within concrete concepts than with abstract concepts (p
< 0.001 vs. p = 0.023): abstract concepts: t1
(28)
= 2.412, SE =
29.046, p = 0.023, D = 0.510; t2
(9)
= 6.571, SE =, p < 0.001,
D = 1.343, concrete concepts: t1
(28)
= 4.206, SE = 27.143, p <
0.001, D = 0.932; t2
(9)
= 12.099, SE = 9.255, p < 0.001, D =
2.321. Finally, to test directly whether the differences between
effectors of abstract and concrete targets differed significantly
from another, we computed the difference score 1M-H between
mouth and hand response times for each participant and for each
target-word:
TABLE 2B | Interaction effector × word.
T’s
Hand responses:abstract vs. concrete words
(paired samples) Participants t(28) = 9.499, SE = 10.909,
p < 0.001, D = 0.727
(independent samples) Concepts t(18) = 5.180, SE = 19.776,
p < 0.001, D = 2.317
Mouth responses: abstract vs. concrete words
(paired samples) Participants t(28) = 4.697, SE = 12.671,
p < 0.001, D = 0.484
(independent samples) Concepts t(18) = 3.184, SE = 19.979,
p = 0.005, D = 1.424
Abstract words: hand vs. mouth responses
(paired samples) Participants t(28) = 2.412, SE = 29.046,
p = 0.023, D = 0.510
(paired samples) Concepts t(9) = 6.571, SE = 11.133,
p < 0.001, D = 1.343
Concrete words: hand vs. mouth responses
(paired samples) Participants t(28) = 4.206, SE = 27.143,
p < 0.001, D = 0.932
(paired samples) Concepts t(9) = 12.099, SE = 9.255,
p < 0.001, D = 2.321
Hand-Mouth difference scores
(paired samples) Participants t(28) = −2.579, SE = 17.103,
p = 0.015, D = 0.295
(independent samples) Concepts t(18) = −2.682, SE = 14.477,
p = 0.015, D = −1.199
TABLE 2C | Results of ratings on hand and mouth involvement.
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Ratings on hand involvement
Abstract words Concrete words
Concepts Mean = 2.902 Mean = 4.90
SD = 0.701 SD = 1.129
Ratings on mouth involvement
Abstract words Concrete words
Concepts Mean = 4.314 Mean = 2.282
SD = 0.976 SD = 0.815
RESULTS
Ratings on hand involvement
(independent samples) Concepts t(18) = −4.759, SE = 0.420,
p < 0.001, D = −2.128
Ratings on mouth involvement
(independent samples) Concepts t(18) = 5.055, SE = 0.402,
p < 0.001, D = 2.261
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FIGURE 3 | Boxplot and beeswarm graph plotting the difference in
response times between the Mouth and the Hand response (1M–H =
MM − MH) for Concrete and Abstract words.
1M-H = MM –MH
where MM is the average response time with the mouth for
each participant/word, and MH is the average response time with
the hand for the same participant/word. We then performed
two analyses on the difference scores: a T Student for paired
samples on participants and a T Student for independent samples
on items. Both analyses were significant, t1
(28)
= −2.579, SE =
17.103, p = 0.015, D = 0.295; t2
(18)
= −2.682, SE = 14.477, p =
0.015,D=−1.199. The results support our prediction of a higher
activation of the mouth with abstract concepts leading to a less
pronounced difference between mouth and hand responses with
abstract concepts (M = 70.06, SD = 29.05) than with concrete
ones (M = 114.17, SD = 27.14; see Figure 3). Figures 4A,B
further show how the Hand-Mouth difference scores vary as a
function of the degree of abstractness and concreteness of each
selected word. Figures 3, 4A,B clearly show that the difference
we found is not simply due to a higher activation of the hand
with abstract words but both to a higher activation of the mouth
with abstract words and of the hand with concrete words.
In order to further verify to what extent the interaction
we found was due more to the higher activation of the hand
with concrete concepts or of the mouth with abstract ones, we
performed ratings on how the selected words activated the hand
and themouth.We asked 16 independent participants to evaluate
using a 7-points Likert scale how much each of the selected
words was involved in a possible action with the hand/the mouth.
For consistency, we used the same question of Granito et al.
(2015) (adapted from Ghio et al., 2013). We presented the same
word in two different blocks (Hand-Mouth and Mouth-Hand),
the order of which was counterbalanced across participants. We
then performed two T Student’s for independent samples on
both concrete and abstract words, one with the Average Hand
Ratings and one with the Average Mouth Ratings. In line with
our predictions, average Mouth Ratings were significantly higher
with abstract than with concrete words, t2
(18)
= 5.055, SE= 0.402,
p < 0.001, D = 2.261, while average Hand Ratings were were
significantly higher with concrete than with abstract words, t2
(18)
= −4.759, SE = 42,026, p < 0.001, D = −2.128 (see Table 2C).
In order to understand whether the pattern of RTs results was
explained more by the hand or by the mouth average ratings, we
performed Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman correlations between
the mouth and hand ratings and the difference scores in RT.
Average Mouth Ratings and Hand-Mouth difference scores in
RTs were negatively correlated, r = −0.400, p = 0.014; r =
−0.585, p = 0.007. The positive correlations between Average
Hand Ratings and Hand-Mouth difference scores in RTs instead
did not reach significance, suggesting that the RTs pattern was
more correlated to the mouth than to the hand ratings, r =
0.292, p = 0.074; r = 0.406, p = 0.075 (see Figures 5A,B). The
correlation results are thus in keeping with the WAT prediction
that mouth activation is stronger with abstract than with concrete
words. Two further ANOVAs, one by-participants and one by-
items, were performed on the proportion of errors (overall,
6.508%). In the analysis on errors only the main effects of
Definition and Word reached significance, and no interaction
was significant. Abstract definitions (M = 0.905) yielded more
errors than Concrete ones (M = 0.397), F1
(1, 28)
= 15.782, R2
= 0.360, p < 0.001; F2
(1, 18)
= 5.046, R2 = 0.219, p = 0.037,
and Abstract target-words (M = 0.940) yielded more errors
than concrete ones (M = 0.362), F1
(1, 28)
= 3.322, R2 = 0.402,
p < 0.001; F2
(1, 18)
= 2.374, R2 = 0.407, p = 0.002. Thus, a
concreteness effect was found. Finally, responses with the mouth
(M = 0.767) yielded slightly more errors than responses with
the hand, but the difference did not reach significance in the by-
participants analysis (M = 0.564), F1
(1, 28)
= 11.833, R2 = 0.106,
p= 0.079; F2
(1, 18)
= 10.236, R2 = 0.363, p= 0.005.
DISCUSSION
The results are rather clear, and they support the hypotheses we
advanced. In line with the great part of existing literature, we
found that concrete words were processed faster than abstract
ones (concreteness effect; e.g., Paivio, 1986). We also found a
concreteness effect with definitions: more concrete definitions,
including more perceptual features and exemplifications, were
processed faster than more abstract, taxonomic definitions.
The finding of a concreteness effect with definitions not only
replicates, but extends results present in current literature.
The interaction between definitions and words is consistent
with the concreteness effect: since abstract words are more
difficult, they benefit more than concrete words of concrete
definitions, likely due to the higher need to ≪ground≫ them
in concrete situations and experiences. Finally, we also found
an overall advantage of the hand over the mouth responses,
likely due to the kind of device we had to use to provide mouth
responses.
The most crucial and novel result, however, is the interaction
we found in response times between the effector used to respond
and the kind of words, showing that with abstract words the
advantage of the hand over the mouth responses was less
pronounced than with concrete ones.
This interaction clearly confirms the hypotheses derived by
WAT, according to which linguistic information characterizes
mostly abstract concepts, hence leading to the activation
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FIGURE 4 | Hand-Mouth difference scores in response times plotted as a function of Abstractness (A) and Concreteness (B) values. The points with a
black border refer to Concrete Words.
of the mouth, while sensorimotor information characterizes
primarily concrete ones. WAT directly predicts that linguistic
and sensorimotor information are differently distributed across
abstract and concrete concepts, and that abstract words activate
more the mouth effector; as to concrete words, they should
activate sensorimotor information of all kinds. Since concrete
words that directly activate the mouth (e.g., food) were not
present, the higher activation of the hand with concrete concepts
is in line withWAT predictions, given the dominance of the hand
in our brain representation. To our knowledge this is the first
study in which a difference in the activation of mouth and hand is
found with response times using≪real≫ concrete and abstract
words.
This finding is in line with solid fMRI results showing
involvement of areas related to language production and
comprehension during abstract concepts processing, as
the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left middle temporal
gyrus (e.g., Wang et al., 2010; Sakreida et al., 2013;
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FIGURE 5 | Hand-Mouth difference scores in response times plotted as a function of Average Mouth Ratings (A) and Average Hand Ratings (B). The
points with a black border refer to Concrete Words.
Hoffman et al., 2015). Further behavioral studies also confirm the
importance of language for abstract concepts. A study on Italian
Sign Language (LIS) has shown that abstract concepts exploit
linguistic information, taken either from the same sign language,
from other sign languages or from spoken languages, to convey
their meaning: for example, the abstract concept “vero” (true)
is expressed using alliteration, i.e., using a handshape which
is also used for the letter V in the manual alphabet (extended
index and middle fingers) and adds movement down and to the
left of the face (Borghi et al., 2014). Finally, also computational
linguistics studies revealed the importance of language for
abstract concepts representation. For example, Recchia and
Jones (2012) demonstrated that abstract concepts benefit of a
semantically rich contexts, while concrete concepts of physically
rich contexts.
As to the mouth activation with abstract concepts, previous
evidence was obtained teaching adults novel categories and
words. Providing adults with an explanation of the characteristics
of novel category members led to a higher activation of
the mouth with abstract than with concrete novel words
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(Borghi et al., 2011). Furthermore, the activation of the mouth
was higher when participants were taught the name and
explained the meaning of new categories (Granito et al., 2015).
To the best of our knowledge the only current evidence
demonstrating a preferential activation of the mouth with
abstract concepts with “real” abstract words and sentences was
obtained through explicit rating tasks. In a study by Ghio et al.
(2013) the authors asked participants to rate howmuch the action
described inMental state, Emotional, andMath-related sentences
(≪She memorizes the procedure≫,≪She feels happy≫,≪She
determines the sum≫) involved themouth, the hand, and the leg.
They found that mental state sentences were highly associated to
the mouth, while number-related sentences were related to the
hand, likely due to finger-counting experiences, and emotion-
related sentences activated both hand and mouth. Granito et al.
(2015) asked participants how much the mouth or the hand
was involved in a possible action with the target items by using
a 7-points Likert scale. Results showed that abstract concepts
activated the mouth more than concrete concepts, independently
of whether concrete concepts represented an homogeneous and
compact category, as in the case of “penguin” (pinguino), or
an heterogeneous category composed by profoundly different
members, as in the case of “tool” (utensile).
To date, however, no study has revealed that abstract concepts
activate themouthmore than concrete concepts with a behavioral
task with real words, in which an implicit task was used. To our
knowledge the present study is the first behavioral one showing
with real words that, even if hands responses are faster with
both concrete and abstract concepts, the activation of linguistic
information with abstract concepts leads to a smaller difference
between mouth and hand responses with abstract than with
concrete concepts.
Why Should Language Be So Important for
Abstract Concepts?
Our study demonstrates that, while responses with the hand
compared to those with the mouth are facilitated with concrete
words, this facilitation is less pronounced with abstract words.
This is mostly due to a higher mouth activation with abstract
concepts, probably due to the activation of linguistic information.
Once determined that linguistic information is crucial for
abstract concepts representation, it is important to understand
why. We outline a series of possible explanations, that are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.
Labels as≪Glue≫ and Language as a Predictive
System
Since abstract concepts refer to more sparse and diverse
experiences compared to those of concrete concepts (even of
superordinate ones), labels can work as a sort of ≪glue≫
keeping them together (Borghi and Binkofski, 2014). Crucially,
words would not only be “pointers” to their referents, but
they would contribute in forming the categories. This clearly
implies intending language not only as a referential system and
a communication system, but a control system that programs
human mind manipulating sensorimotor experiences (Lupyan
and Bergen, 2016). Recent results have demonstrated that also
concrete labels help us in building and forming a category. For
example, Lupyan and collaborators (Lupyan, 2012; Boutonnet
and Lupyan, 2015) have shown that visual processing is facilitated
after hearing the name ≪dog≫ compared to when hearing a
sound, such as the sound of a barking dog. Language can provide
a means of building predictions: for example, listening to a word
can help our visual system to process noisy inputs (Lupyan and
Clark, 2015). Evidence obtained mimicking the acquisition of
novel categories and words has shown that the contribution of
the name to the category formation and the explanation of the
word meaning is more crucial for learning abstract words, likely
due to the diversity of their referents; and this can explain the
strong activation of linguistic information with them. Results
with pictures indicate that, when participants are provided with
explanations of the wordmeaning, themouth is activated (Borghi
et al., 2011); furthermore, results with categories the members
of which are built through Lego revealed that such activation is
more marked when participants have been taught the category
name and explained its meaning (Granito et al., 2015).
Words as Social Tools, Sign Tracking
Consider the difference between “bottle” and “justice”: it is
much easier to understand the meaning of “bottle” than of
“justice” without the help of others. To understand abstract words
we need to rely more on other people’s opinions, definitions,
and explanations. Consistently, comprehension of the very first
abstract words has been related with the development, at 10
and 14 months of age, of crucial social cognition abilities, like
that of following the gaze of others and of engaging in joint
actions (Bergelson and Swingley, 2013). The importance of the
social abilities for the representation of abstract concepts has
been well captured by Prinz (2002, 2012) who has spoken of
a “word tracking strategy” we would use to access conceptual
meaning: abstract words, such as “democracy” would be grasped
in part through concrete images, in part through verbal skills.
We would namely track definitions used by other authoritative
members of our community to help reference (re-enactment).
The activation of the mouth in the current experiment, in which
participants are given definitions of concepts, is consistent with
this account; importantly, we found that concrete definitions are
particularly crucial for abstract words, that need more examples
and perceptual information to be “grounded.”
Language as a Way to Improve Our Computational
Abilities through Inner Speech
It has been suggested that language has the important role of
improving our computational abilities (e.g., Clark, 1998). This
improvement can occur through inner speech: the seminal work
by Vygotsky has shown that words can become internalized
and support our thought processes: for example, speaking to
ourselves helps us to better memorize and plan our actions
(Vygotsky, 1986). The capability of language to enhance thought
processes has been specifically related to abstract concepts by
Dove (2009, 2011, 2016). However, according to Dove this
potentialities are due to the amodal character of language:
he argues that language acquisition would create a new “dis-
embodied” semantic system, characterized by many similarities
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with amodal systems of traditional cognitive science. We think
that the computational abilities language offers are particularly
crucial for abstract concepts, because they are “hard” words, but
we do not see why such a system should be disembodied and
amodal. In contrast, we think that the activation of language
through inner speech can have an embodied counterpart, the
activation of the mouth we found.
Which Are the Possible Mechanisms
Underlying the Mouth Activation?
It remains to be established, which mechanism underlies the
activation of the mouth. Two possible mechanisms can cause this
activation; importantly, they are not mutually exclusive and also
both could be responsible for the mouth activation.
The first mechanism is re-enactment. As argued by WAT and
explained in the introduction, abstract concepts are acquired
in a peculiar way: since they do not have concrete and
clearly bounded referents and because their referents are quite
heterogeneous, the labels and explanations of their meaning are
crucial to acquire them, hence the linguistic-social experience
plays a major role. The re-enactment of this peculiar acquisition
experience could be responsible for the mouth activation. The
results of the present experiment cannot determine whether this
mechanism is in action, since the experiment focuses on existent
words that have already been acquired by participants. However,
we computed Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman correlations between
RTs and Modality of Acquisition values in Della Rosa et al.’s
(2010) database, and we found that they were highly significant,
respectively r = 0.474, p = 0.004; r = 0.699, p = 0.001.
This suggests that the Modality of Acquisition (perceptual vs.
linguistic) contributes in explaining the RTs pattern; whether this
is the only cause or only one among the causes of the mouth
activation has to be determined through further experiments.
This mechanism is compatible both with the idea that labels
are a sort of glue and with the sign tracking view: we would
namely re-enact both the experiences related to the conceptual
referent and the linguistic-social experiences related to the
acquisition of the concept. Further evidence on acquisition of
novel categories and words supports this view: providing adults
with an explanation of the characteristics of novel category
members led to a higher activation of the mouth with abstract
than with concrete words (Borghi et al., 2011). Furthermore, the
activation of themouth was higher when participants were taught
the name and explained the meaning of new categories (Granito
et al., 2015). Finally, recent results show that abstract words are
more associated to the acoustic modality than concrete ones
(Scerrati et al., 2016). Re-enactment would lead to the activation
of the mouth since elegant evidence by Fadiga, D’Ausilio and
collaborators has shown that both language comprehension and
production activate the motor system (e.g., D’Ausilio et al., 2009,
2012).
Another possible mechanism is the re-explanation through
inner talk. Due to the fact that abstract words are “hard”
words to learn (Gleitman et al., 2005; Gentner, 2006), we
might need to re-explain to ourselves their meaning, formulating
predictions against which sensory experiences can be assessed,
possibly through the mediation of inner talk. This mechanism
is compatible with the view of language as a way to improve
our computational abilities through inner speech. Supporting
evidence comes from the rating study by Ghio et al. (2013)
showing that mental state sentences activate preferentially the
mouth. The adoption of this re-explanationmechanism, perfectly
in line with WAT, is also compatible with the proposal on
abstract concepts representation advanced in 2005 by Barsalou
and Wiemer-Hastings. It is namely possible that both the longer
response times required by abstract concepts and the shorter time
required with the mouth than with the hand device are due to
the fact that participants re-explain to themselves the meaning of
abstract concepts, thanks to introspection, possibly through the
use of inner talk. The use of introspection, due also to a specific
content (e.g., the high presence of mental words), would then due
to an internal mechanism (e.g., talking to oneself?), which could
explain the mouth activation.
Since it focuses on words that participants already know, the
present experiment does not allow us to determine which of the
two mechanism –re-enactment or re-explanation—underlies the
activation of the mouth, or if both mechanisms are responsible
for it. Further research on development and acquisition is needed,
to address this complex question.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, our results indicate for the first time not only that
abstract concepts are grounded in experiences, but also that
they are embodied: we found that with abstract concepts the
advantage of the hand responses over the mouth responses was
less pronounced than with concrete concepts, mainly due to
a higher activation of the mouth with abstract concepts. This
clearly confirms the prediction of the WAT theory with existent
abstract and concrete words.
The result has important implications also for other recent
theories that we reviewed in the introduction. It disconfirms
embodied views according to which no difference between
abstract and concrete concepts exists and it is not predicted by
other theories on abstract concepts as the CMT and the AEA
view. Furthermore, it suggests how to possibly integrate the
multiple representation views and the introspective view.
Consider recent theories that take inspiration from Paivio’s
view, as the proposal by Dove, and the neural evidence favoring
a dual systems account (e.g., Sabsevitz et al., 2005; Binder et al.,
2005). According to Dove different levels of embodiment exist,
and abstract concepts activate language considered as an amodal
medium. The evidence we provide suggests that abstract concepts
activate language through an embodied experience, likely a form
of inner talk that leads to the preferential activation of a specific
effector, the mouth. While it is in line with the view according
to which language plays a major role in abstract concepts
representation, it also suggests that linguistic information is
activated through an embodied mechanism.
Furthermore, the results allow the exploration of the
possibility to reconcile WAT and introspective view of abstract
concepts (Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). It is namely
possible that, due to the complexity of abstract concepts, they
evoke introspective information, and that this information is
rehearsed and monitored through an embodied mechanism like
talking to oneself.
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